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N A T IO N A L T R A N S P O R T A T I O N S A F E T Y B O A R D
The National Transportation Safety Board was established by
Congress in the Department of Transportation Act of 1966. The
safety board’s basic functions include the investigation of major trans
portation accidents in all modes of transportation and the execution of
special studies of safety problems which influence casualties in trans
portation. The safety board is made up of a chairman and four members,
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The chairman
of the safety board is John H. Reed, former governor of the state of
Maine. The safety board develops recommendations in transportation
safety which are directed to the administrations of the Department of
Transportation and other nationally important institutions which in
fluence transportation safety.
SA FE TY BO A R D A D O P T S S T U D Y — C O M P A T IB IL IT Y
O F S T A N D A R D S F O R D R IV E R S, V E H IC L E S A N D
H IG H W A Y S
Mutually Compatible Definitions of Performance Largely Absent for
Systems A nalysis
In 1969 the safety board adopted what we believe to be a very
significant study titled, “ Compatibility of Standards for Drivers, Ve
hicles, and Highways.” This study described the wide range of stand
ards which, assembled, constitute the functional definition of the
highway and the vehicle operating system. It has been appreciated
for some time that the safety performance of drivers, roads, and
highways was only poorly defined, if compared with the degree of
definition and specification found in other well-developed systems,
such as aerospace systems. The problem was strongly emphasized,
however, when an effort was made to employ system analysis and
system design in connection with the New York State Safety Car
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Project of 1966. This project was a precursor of the present Experi
mental Safety Vehicle Authority of the Department of Transportation.
That early effort highlighted a major problem of the highway trans
portation system. The study report of that project said:
“ . . . The vehicle’s performance cannot be defined except in rela
tion to (poorly defined safety performance parameters of the
driver and road). . . . It is only in terms of mutually compatible
definitions of performance that the different elements of a traffic
system can be assembled and seen as an operational system.”
This statement is, of course, completely true for any type of
system subject to the systems approach. The safety board’s study showed
in detail that the mutually compatible definitions of performance were
largely absent. The study described the nature of the incompatibility
in considerable detail and discussed the problems of organization which
would have to be solved if compatible standards were ever to be pro
duced.
Systems Approach and Defining and Interrelating
Compatible Functions— Standards
Under the systems approach, the construction of a functional sys
tem depends upon defining and interrelating the necessary functions.
If the methods of defining these functions (let’s call them standards
for the time being) are technically incompatible, or if the standards
merely describe the structure of the system rather than its function,
then it will be almost impossible to employ the standards to describe
an integrated operating system. W e cannot assess the mode of opera
tion which was intended by the designers, nor can we analyze the
operation actually produced, without introducing novel methods of
analysis of a nonstandard nature. The result of this difficulty is that
we are led to consider the operation of the system mostly in terms of
the effectiveness of its isolated parts. Inevitably, we must make our
decisions of highway and vehicle design, and driver selection on a
narrow basis. This leads to hazardous and inefficient operations.
E X A M P L E S O F D IF F IC U L T IE S P R O D U C E D BY
IN C O M P A T IB L E S T A N D A R D S
Standards Defined
Now, that is a theoretical statement of the difficulty produced by
incompatible standards. A few examples will serve to show what we
are talking about in practical engineering terms.
First, we are considering under the word “ standard” any form
of specification, standard, definition, or description which serves to
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describe the combined operation of the driver, the vehicle and the
highway, whether voluntary or regulatory. W e include, for example,
the Snellen eye chart used to test the visual acuity of drivers. W e
include the functional description of instrumented anthropometric
dummies which represent the human body in crash injury tests. W e
include crash-test objects which represent objects along the highway
which may be struck by vehicles. W e include highway design policies.
There appear to be hundreds of such standards. W e are not concerned
with those elements of description which are internal to one part of
the system, such as the compressive strength of concrete, the voltage
used for vehicle light, the driver’s eyeglass prescription, or the specifi
cation of his hearing aid.
Incompatibility of Standards of Rear View M irror Visibility and
Standards for Geometric Design
The first example describes a problem which is on the way toward
solution in the case of passenger cars. I refer to the incompatibility be
tween standards of rear view mirror visibility and standards for the
geometric design of highways. Acceptable highway designs include
many illustrations of merging or weaving situations in which a
vehicle can potentially be overtaken by traffic approaching from the
left or right rear. Half a dozen are shown in the blue book of A A S H O .
Tangential entries are allowable on the interstate system, and indeed,
are the normal method of entry to high speed lanes. Notice, however,
that such standards are not numerical descriptions of a functional re
quirement, but simply layouts of acceptable design. There is no state
ment in these layouts of any assumed or intended rear vision character
istics of vehicles which will use the roads.
On the vehicle side, we have “ Federal M otor Vehicle Safety
Standard 111” which specifies, “ Requirements for rear view mirrors
to provide the driver with a clear and reasonably unobstructed view
to the rear.” This standard is numerical in nature, producing with an
inside rear view mirror a view to the rear of at least 20 degrees
horizontal angle. However, since this view may be totally obscured by
interior loading which is not disapproved under the standard, an out
side rear view mirror on the driver’s side is also required. The per
formance standard for the outside rear view mirror is stated in terms
of points and distances from the driver’s eyes which must be visible in
the rear view mirror.
It can be shown by calculation that within the standard layouts
of A A S H O , one vehicle can approach another vehicle from the rear
in such a way that the rear vehicle cannot reliably be detected by the
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forward driver using his rear view mirror. Thus, the forward driver,
if he perceives this difficulty, ceases to employ the rear view mirror
and will turn to the rear, looking through the left side windows of
the vehicle (or the right side where merging into the left lane is
permitted). W e all know the hazard which this produces. One cannot
look to the rear and forward at the same time. O f course, there are
also no windshield wiping or defrosing standards for the vehicle side
windows which must be used in this situation. M ost important, the
existence of these standards has not served to show that a hazard
existed, and thus the standard is of little use in creating a safe system.
This difficulty may be greatly alleviated by the current D O T
proposal to alter the rear visibility standard so that it will, in effect,
require periscopic rear view mirrors for passenger cars. The rear vision
angle may increase by 1976 from about 20 degrees to about 80 degrees.
W e do not know whether this proposal was assisted by the safety
board’s study, but we would like to think that it was.
Incompatibility of Standards of Driver Vision and
Traffic Sign Legibility
Consider the need for technical coordination of standards which
describe driver vision capability and traffic signing legibility. Systematic
control of the interaction between drivers and signs requires at least
consideration of four matters: driver visual acuity, traffic sign lettersizes, placement of signs relative to highway features, and allowable
speed. The lack of compatible definitions makes it unnecessarily diffi
cult to analyze these factors at any given highway location.
The 1967 vision requirements for motor vehicle operators show
a variety of visual acuity ranging from 20/4 0 to 20/70. The require
ments for visual acuity are such that several states now license some
drivers who are unable to detect words on signs until they are much
closer to the sign than other drivers licensed in the same states. It
also appears that some states having very high speed limits also employ
the lower standard for visual acuity, while other states having low
speed limits employ the higher standard of visual acuity.
This driver vision standard, employing the Snellen eye chart, is
based upon the tested ability of persons to read letters similar to
those of highway signs. A person having 2 0/2 0 vision is able to read
at 20 feet, letters of a height that a person having normal (youthful)
vision can also see at 20 feet. A person having 2 0/7 0 vision can read
at 20 feet, letters readable by a normal person at 70 feet. Thus the
standard is, on the surface, merely a relative standard.
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A t the other end of the vision circuit, the legibility of traffic signs
is defined simply by the height of the letters and the size of the sign
which must be used in certain areas. This is the method employed in
the Manual for Signing and Pavement Marking of the National Sys
tem of Interstate and Defense Highways. There is no standard way to
relate the visual acuity standard to the legibility standard.
Difficulties are thus created. It can be shown by calculation, for
example, that a motorist having 2 0/2 0 vision is able to read signs
specifying exit speed from the interstate system at a distance of 920
feet from the sign; whereas, the driver having 2 0/7 0 vision cannot
read the sign until he is only 263 feet from the sign. This driver, if
moving at legally allowed speed of 60 miles per hour at such a location,
has three seconds for perception, reaction, and braking which will
reduce the speed of his vehicle from 60 miles per hour to the posted
ramp speed of 20 miles per hour. This does not mean that the opera
tion at these exits is unsafe at all times, because drivers can, in day
light, see other indications of the need for lower speed. The problem
does mean, however, that the placement of a sign does not provide
assurance that it is adequate under the full range of existing drivers
and speed combinations.
The correction for this difficulty seems rather simple. By going to
the original definition of visiual acuity according to the Snellen eye
chart, we find that 20/2 0 vision also means that letters of a certain
included angle can be seen at a 20-foot distance. Thus, calculations
can be employed to develop charts which would interrelate the factors
of driver visual acuity, speed, and letter size required in signs. The
charts could then provide a more systematic basis for sign placement.
It is a simple task, but no one has done it yet on an authoritative level.
Incompatibility of Standards of Windshield Visibility Versus
Standards of Sign Placement
There are many other problems of this type. It can be shown that
the standards of windshield visibility in Federal M otor Vehicle Safety
Standards 103 and 104 are stated in different technical terms than
standards for placement of signs appearing in the Manual on Uniform
Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways. The methods of
definition of the vision capability are stated in angular terms in the
one standard and in terms of linear dimensions in the other standard.
Thus, rather difficult calculations are required in order to make an
analytical placement of a stop line or of the faces of a traffic signal.
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Barrier Characteristics Definition Vs. Definition of Crash Test Objects
W e are seeing a great deal of effort to produce improved barrier
systems which will prevent vehicles from striking heavy obstacles along
the highway. At present, however, the definitions of barrier character
istics are not related to the definition of crash test objects employed
in Federal M otor Vehicle Safety Standards. One result is that ve
hicles are not actually required to be tested by impacts against any
of the guardrails or median barriers described in the relevant docu
ments of the Highway Research Board. This is not yet a problem of
inadequate communication, but a state-of-the-art problem. This field
is relatively young and growing rapidly. For example, we still do not
have a systematic test of the results of crashing trucks into highway
guardrails. It is easy to see that there should be an objective of merging
these standards as they are developed so that a true description of
interrelated system performance would be created.
N O N S Y S T E M A T IC O R IN C O N S IS T E N T S T A N D A R D S
IN E L E M E N T S O F H I G H W A Y S Y S T E M
These examples describe problems with the interrelationship among
vehicle, highway, and drivers. However, there are many examples of
nonsystematic or inconsistent standards or specifications occurring en
tirely within the province of standards agencies in each of the three
main elements in the highway system. For example, we have highways
in which the stopping sight distance over a hill is below the distance at
which a stop can be made at the established speed limit. In the vehicle
standards field, we find that for typical night speed limits the head
lights of vehicles do not provide sufficient forward illumination to
permit a driver to perceive an object, react, and stop before the object
is reached. There is a clear inconsistency between necessity to dim
headlights for vehicles in an opposing lane and the need to employ
one’s own headlights to see objects in one’s own lane. In the field of
driver definitions, we know that vehicle seating and control arrange
ments are determined for a given range of drivers’ size, but we do not
account either in the licensing arrangements or in the qualifications of
vehicles for those drivers who are outside the range.
W H A T P R O B L E M S O F S Y S T E M D E F I N IT IO N M E A N
Uncertainty of System Operating Within Known Safety Margins
W hat do such problems of system definition mean in practical
terms? First, where standards are incompatible, the great difficulty in
analyzing the interrelationships means that we are not certain that
the system will actually operate within known safety margins. The
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margins of operation in which hazards can develop are literally un
known.
Advanced Development of Highway System Retarded
Second, the advanced development of a highway transportation
system will be retarded. This consideration is more important than
it seems because so many of the problems of incompatibility of stand
ards influence the efficiency of operation as well as the safety of opera
tion. For example, when a driver suffers from delayed reading of
traffic signs, he may miss his turnoff on the interstate system and be
legally required to drive many miles in order to return.
Dependence on Allowing Occurrence of Accidents to Show
Improvement Needs
Third, incompatibility of standards means that we are dependent
upon allowing the occurrence of accidents and analysis of the results of
the accidents to show the need for improvements in existing roads and
for changes in advanced highway design standards. W e are now placing
great emphasis upon the maintenance of traffic records and analysis to
determine high hazard locations and to point out inadequacies of design.
Yet, it appears that many of the problems revealed by this long-term
analysis could have been revealed without waiting for accidents to
occur by means of engineering analysis based upon standards.
N O C O M P A T IB L E S Y S T E M S T A N D A R D S —
N O SY S T E M S A N A L Y S IS
The example of the Apollo Project provides perspective. W ould
anyone believe that it would have been possible to design any of the
major systems or subsystems in the Apollo Project by relying upon
accident data to prove that a hazard existed? In actual fact there
has been only one significant accident in the Apollo Project which has
not been compensated for by system design. Thus, in a very real sense,
the absence of compatible system standards for highway transporta
tion prohibits us from employing one of the major modern techniques,
that of systems analysis.
Inadequate Standards and the Problem of Teaching Highway
Transportation
This problem of inadequate standards even reaches into the teach
ing of highway transportation, highway engineering, and automotive
engineering. In most modern technological systems, the systems ap
proach is a basic method of organization. Yet, the systems approach is
not now taught as a practical approach in highway engineering, traffic
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engineering, or automotive engineering. Elaborate data systems and
business systems are being installed for highway transportation ele
ments which are not a system. Systems engineering can be used only
for subsystems in highway transportation.
M ajor Implications for the Future
The 1969 safety board study of incompatibility of standards pointed
out the major implications for the future from the continued process
of development of regulatory standards which are not joined by system
concepts. Almost every new standard which describes the functional
operation of a major element in the highway transportation system will
have to be changed or reinterpreted eventually if we are ever to enjoy
the benefits of integrated operation in a true highway transportation
system. W e are constantly producing new standards which describe
system performance and which are not compatibly related. The task
of correction is becoming more difficult with every new standard which
is not analyzed for system compatibility.
Use of Interim Transitional Definitions
The 1969 study of the safety board also included methods for
dealing with this problem, both in the long and short term. In the
short term, the safety board proposed the use of what it called, “ Interim
transitional definitions.” An interim transitional definition might consist
of the development of charts which would relate Snellen eye test results
to traffic sign letter heights. It is believed that these interim transitional
definitions would cover a portion of the problem, but not all of it.
Organization of Standard Producing Institutions
A more significant problem is that of the organization of standardproducing institutions which could attack the problem of new compati
ble standards. The safety board identified about one dozen institutions
or organizations which substantially affect the development of standards
and definitions which apply to highway transportation and its elements.
The board also noted that the Department of Transportation has sig
nificant capability to encourage compatibility in these standards through
adoption or nonadoption of the standards in rules, regulations, or as
a prerequisite for funding. Accordingly, one of the safety board’s
recommendations to the federal highway administrator (at that time
responsible for all federal use of these standards) was that he undertake
the task of leading improved organization of these standards through
the efforts of the many organizations. The board recommended spe
cifically a detailed review of the problems of communication and fields
of responsibility among the agencies.
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An Ad H oc

C om T n ittee on

Highway System Standards

The Federal Highway Administration has, in accordance with
these recommendations, a continuing function in one of its offices in
the form of an ad hoc committee on highway system standards. The
staff person in charge is Charles Prisk, one of the most experienced
task force organizers in the Federal Highway Administration.
A D E T E R R E N T T O T H E S Y ST E M S A P P R O A C H
I should not close without pointing out also one of the major dis
advantages in applying the systems approach to present and future
highway operations. That disadvantage is, strange to say, the very
strong drive now being made in all government agencies to ensure that
government efforts are most economically applied. Every agency
involved with highway safety is seeking to show that the benefits of its
efforts in accident loss reduction are worth the cost of the effort. C ost/
benefit and cost-effectiveness analysis are disciplines sought to be applied
in the whole process of allocation of funds and efforts. It appears
however, that this strong drive for efficiency may in some cases tend
to oppose the application of a full systems approach. The reason is
that it is far easier to prove that accidents and accident fatalities and
losses will be reduced by studying the existing accidents, than by
studying the larger scale disorganization of the system. When high
accident locations are detectable, for example, it is readily apparent
that concentrated effort to repair the situation at that location will
save lives and prevent accidents efficiently. The analytical method of
proving how attention to system organization will prevent lives from
being lost more efficiently is much more difficult. W e can, however,
show by historical example that intense system organization can produce
almost a perfect safety record. The near-perfect record of the Atomic
Energy Commission and the excellent record of the Apollo Project
are examples. The very low fatality record in commercial aviation and
in rail rapid transit are other examples. W e also know intuitively that
a highway transportation system which is shaped by the repeated appli
cation of corrective and repair measures will probably not reach the
highly efficient status that will be needed. Perhaps the discussion period
can help to develop some new ideas in meeting this particular problem.

